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Synopsis
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA 1984-1985
Nineteen eight-five witnessed additional ratifications of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but the LOS Conven-
tion still has not received one-half of the number necessary to
bring it into force. Some success was seen in boundary delimita-
tions, fishing treaties, and pollution control, yet news events
brought the grim realization that many issues, such as terrorism
at sea, the conflict between nuclear-testing nations and those wish-
ing to eliminate such testing, and constraints on the freedom of
navigation, are far from resolved. Lastly, the discovery of the Ti-
tanic and the movement to designate it as a memorial, free of sal-
vage, brought hope that at least some treasures of the sea may be
preserved for the benefit of mankind.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Ratification Status
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea1 (LOS
Convention) was adopted on April 30, 1982 and opened for signature
on December 10, 1982. As of December 9, 1984, the signature clos-
ing date, 159 countries had signed the convention.2 Thirty-six states
and entities made declarations in accordance with articles 287, 298,
310 and Annex IX, article 2.3
i. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter cited as LOS
Convention].
2. The signatory countries of the LOS Convention, as of December 9, 1982,
were comprised of 51 from Africa, 45 from Asia, 30 from Latin America, 10 from East-
ern Europe, and 23 from Western Europe. Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 4, at I (Feb.
1985) [hereinafter cited as LOS Bulletin No. 4]; see also Simmonds, The Status of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 359
(1985).
3. For the text of declarations made at the time of signature to the LOS Con-
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While the United States finds that most provisions of the LOS
Convention are consistent with United States interests and in general
serve the interests of all nations, the deep seabed mining provisions
expressed in part XI are deemed to be contrary to accepted princi-
ples of international law.4 The United States maintains that "deep
seabed mining remains a lawful exercise of the freedom of the high
seas open to all nations." However, articles 136 and 137 of the LOS
Convention state that mineral resources of "The Area"6 are the
"common heritage of mankind," which may only be explored and
exploited under the authorization of the International Sea-Bed Au-
thority (ISA).7
United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, in a Decem-
ber 10, 1984 statement made before the General Assembly, recog-
nized this disagreement. He noted that some states,8 although sup-
porting the LOS Convention as a whole, found the deep seabed
mining provisions unsatisfactory. He vowed to encourage reconcilia-
tion between the signatory and nonsignatory nations and to promote
the uniform and consistent application of the LOS Convention. 9
The LOS Convention will become effective one year after sixty
states ratify or accede to it.10 By the beginning of 1985, fourteen
vention, see Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 5 (July 1985) [hereinafter cited as LOS Bulle-
tin No. 5].
4. Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, West Germany, and other western nations
do not support.the deep seabed mining provisions of the LOS Convention. See generally
Pierce, Selective Adoption of the New Law of the Sea: The United States Proclaims its
Exclusive Economic Zone, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 581 (1983).
5. Statement by President Ronald W. Reagan (March 10, 1983), in Current
Policy No. 471, "Oceans Policy and the Exclusive Economic Zone", United States De-
partment of State, Bureau of Public Affairs (1983); see also Larson, The Reagan Rejec-
tion of the U.N. Convention, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 337 (1985).
6. "The Area" is defined as the "sea bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof
beyond national jurisdiction." National jurisdiction extends to the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin, or to a distance of 200 miles from the baseline where the margin does
not extend up to 200 miles. The area comprises approximately 60 percent of the seabed.
R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 160 (1985); see also Gamble, Assess-
ing the Reality of the Deep Sea-Bed Regime, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 779 (1985).
7. The International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) is the body through which the
state parties to the LOS Convention are to organize and control all resource-oriented
uses of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 156-
57. The ISA has three principal organs: The Plenary Assembly, Council, and the Secre-
tariat. The mining area of the ISA is called the "Enterprise." R. CHURCHILL & A.
LowE, supra note 6, at 160.
8. United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar was referring especially
to the Republic of West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
9. However, Secretary-General de Cuellar did not elaborate upon how he pro-
posed to reconcile these differences. LOS Bulletin No. 4, supra note 2, at 1.
10. Ratification is a process which takes place in a state's legislative body. Article
304 defines "signature" as it is used in the LOS Convention. Articles 305 and 306 define
"ratification" and "accession" as they are used in the LOS Convention. LOS Convention,
supra note I, arts. 304-06.
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nations had ratified the LOS Convention." During 1985, it was rati-
fied by eleven more nations, bringing the total to twenty-five. 12 The
LOS Convention will remain open indefinitely for any nation willing
to accede to it.'3
There is no guarantee that all signatory nations will ratify the
LOS Convention. Many nations expressed reservations in declara-
tions accompanying their signatures. Articles 309 and 310 of the
LOS Convention provide that, though a state may make declarations
at the signing, ratification requires that the Convention be accepted
in its entirety. Declarations will not exclude or modify the legal ef-
fect of the LOS Convention's provisions in their application to that
state.'4
The United States refusal to sign the LOS Convention or to par-
ticipate in the Preparatory Commission' 5 meetings may deter ratifi-
cation by other countries. With fewer than one-half of the sixty rati-
fications required to bring the LOS Convention into force, the
United States refusal to sign the LOS Convention is a source of frus-
tration to the Preparatory Commission. The Preparatory Commis-
sion, therefore, is exerting increased pressure on the United States to
support the LOS Convention. For example, the Commission resolved
at the second meeting of the Preparatory Commission of 1985, to
condemn as illegal all deep seabed activities outside the LOS
Convention.' 6
11. LOS Bulletin No. 4, supra note 1, at 2-5.
12. Law of the Sea Report of the Secretary-General, 40 U.N. GAOR (Agenda
Item 36) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/40/923 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 Report of the
Secretary-General]. The 25 ratifications received are still fewer than one-half of the 60
needed to bring the LOS Convention into effect.
The dates of the ratifications are as follow: Sudan on January 23, 1985, St. Lucia on
March 27, 1985, Togo on April 16, 1985, Tunisia on April 24, 1985, Bahrain on May
30, 1985, Iceland on June 21, 1985, Mali on July 16, 1985, Iraq on July 30, 1985,
Guinea on September 6, 1985, Republic of Tanzania on September 30, 1985, and the
Republic of Cameroon on November 19, 1985. See generally Citizens for Oceans Law,
Oceans Pol'y News, March-Dec. 1985.
13. LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 309-11.
14. Id.
15. The LOS Convention provides that after 50 signatures have been recorded, a
Preparatory Commission shall meet in order to establish the institution of the LOS Con-
vention. LOS Convention, supra note 1, Final Act, Annex I, Resolution I, art. 1; see also
Simmonds, supra note 2, at 360. The activities of the Preparatory Commission are re-
ported to the UN General Assembly annually in the Report of the Secretary-General.
1985 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 12, at 5.
16. Declaration Adopted by the Preparatory Commission on 30 August 1985,
U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/72 (1985), [hereinafter cited as Declaration Adopted by the Pre-
paratory Commission] reprinted in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 6, at 86 (1985) [herein-
after cited as LOS Bulletin No. 6].
Resolution on Funding
On December 13, 1984, the United Nations General Assembly ap-
proved Resolution L.35 on the Law of the Sea.17 This resolution ap-
proved two meetings of the Preparatory Commission for 1985, re-
quested the Secretary-General's continued assistance in the
implementation of the LOS Convention, and solicited support from
the various organs of the United Nations (UN) system to achieve
these goals.18 As has been true in the past, the funding of the Pre-
paratory Commission was subject to much debate.
L.35 and its accompanying budget requirements were approved by
a vote of 138-2 in the UN General Assembly on December 12, 1984.
The United States and Turkey voted against the resolution and five
countries"9 abstained. The United States, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom objected to funding the Preparatory Commission out of the
UN regular budget.
The United States maintains that the cost of the Preparatory
Commission should be borne by those nations that are parties to the
LOS Convention. 20 This position was first espoused in President
Reagan's December 30, 1982 statement,2' in which he declared that
the Commission's costs should be funded by those nations party to
the LOS Convention, because the Commission is legally independent
and not answerable to the UN. 22 Reagan also announced that fund-
ing of the Preparatory Commission from the general UN budget is
not a proper expense under article 17(2) of the UN Charter.23
During 1985, the United States continued its policy of withholding
its pro rata share of the Preparatory Commission costs from its an-
17. Report of the Secretary-General on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doe. No. A/
39/647 (1984); see also Citizens for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at
I.
18. Id.
19. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Israel, Peru, United Kingdom, and
Venezuela abstained. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 3.
20. U.N. Press Release USUN 177-83 (Dec. 14, 1983).
21. In his three page statement, the President stated:
[The UN General Assembly resolution which finances the Preparatory Com-
mission budget from the regular UN budget] is not a proper expense of the
United Nations within the meaning of its own Charter, as the Law of the Sea
Preparatory Commission is legally independent of an distinct from the UN. It
is not a UN subsidiary organ. It is not answerable to the United Nations.
Membership in the UN does not obligate any member to finance or to other-
wise support any other organization. Statement by President Ronald W. Rea-
gan (Dec. 30, 1982), U.N. Press Release USUN 1-(83) (Jan. 3, 1983).
22. Id.
23. Id. Article 17(2) of the UN Charter provides that: "The expenses of the or-
ganization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 17(2). President Reagan stated that the expenses of
the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission are not expenses "of the Organization"
since that Commission is legally independent of and distinct from the UN organization.
Statement by President Ronald W. Reagan, supra note 21.
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nual UN assessment.24 On December 10, 1985, at the UN General
Assembly, the United States and Turkey again opposed the funding
of the Preparatory Commission from the UN general budget. The
United States announced that it would continue to withhold its pro
rata share of the Commission's funding from its annual UN
assessment.
25
The continuance of this withholding policy comes at a time when
United States support for the UN is at a low ebb. The UN, observ-
ing its fortieth birthday, is seen as going through a "midlife crisis."'26
The United States has withdrawn from the United Nations Educa-
tion, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and has refused to submit
to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in po-
litical matters.27
Furthermore, unless the UN agrees, by the end of 1986, to weigh
voting in the General Assembly according to each member's finan-
cial contribution, the United States intends to reduce significantly its
share of the UN annual 806 million dollar budget, from twenty-five
to twenty percent.28
December 10, 1985 Meeting of the General Assembly
The General Assembly passed the annual Law of the Sea resolu-
tion29 on December 10, 1985, by a vote of 140 to 2. Turkey and the
United States voted against the resolution, and five nations ab-
stained.30 The three main issues debated were: the status of the Au-
gust 30, 1985 declaration condemning as illegal any deep seabed
mining licenses issued outside of the Preparatory Commission;3' the
Philippines' declaration made upon ratification of the Convention in
24. Citizens for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 3.
25. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan. 1986, at 3.
26. Time, Oct. 28, 1985, at 38-40.
27. On October 7, 1985, the United States, reversing 39 years of policy, an-
nounced that it would limit United States acceptance of decisions by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) (which was hearing charges from Nicaragua that the United
States was illegally supporting rebels attempting to overthrow the Sandinista govern-
ment) to nonpolitical issues. Only about one-third of the countries in the world have
agreed to accept the ICJ decisions. Nicaragua itself does not accept the compulsory juris-
diction of the ICJ, nor does the Soviet Union, France, West Germany, Italy, and Spain.
San Diego Union, Oct. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
28. Time, Oct. 28, 1985, at 38-40.
29. 40 U.N. GAOR (110th plenary meeting) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/63
(1985).
30. Id. The five abstentions to Resolution A/40/RES/63 were: Federal Republic
of Germany, Israel, Peru, United Kingdom, and Venezuela.
31. Declaration Adopted by the Preparatory Commission, supra note 16.
1984;32 and the early registration of pioneer investors. 33
The August 1985 declaration adopted by the Preparatory Com-
mission34 was accepted without a vote, following an understanding
between its sponsor, "the group of 77,' '35 and other delegations. This
process lead to the criticism that it did not represent a consensus of
the Preparatory Commission.36
The Philippines, upon its ratification of the LOS Convention on
May 8, 1984,37 claimed that archipelagic waters, under the Constitu-
tion of the Philippines, are similar to internal waters. This declara-
tion also removed the straits connecting archipelagic waters with ei-
ther the EEZ or the high seas from transit passage, effectively
destroying the right of innocent passage for international naviga-
tion. 38 Several nations39 objected to the Philippines' declaration on
the grounds that it was incompatible with article 31040 of the LOS
Convention. Article 310 permits states ratifying the LOS Convention
to make declarations; however, it does not exempt them from the
provisions of the LOS Convention which may be incompatible with
the declaration. 1
32. LOS Bulletin No. 4, supra note 2, at 21.
33. Pioneer investors are those who had submitted applications with the ISA as of
December 9, 1984, and are bound by rules and procedures drafted by the Preparatory
Commission. Such procedures require minimum investments in the pioneer site, transfer
of technology to both the ISA and developing nations, and the designation of two mining
sites - one for the pioneer investor and one for the Enterprise, the mining are of the ISA.
R. CHURCHILL & A. LoWE, supra note 6, at 172.
34. See Declaration Adopted by the Preparatory Commission, supra note 16.
35. The Group of 77 represents the developing, or third world countries. At the
LOS Convention, the Group of 77 actually had a membership of 120 states. See Lee,
The New Law of the Sea and the Pacific Basin, 12 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 247, 256
(1983).
36. 1985 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 12, at 30.
37. LOS Bulletin No. 4, supra note 2, at 21.
38. Id.
39. These protesting nations include Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Czechoslovakia, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
40. LOS Convention, supra note I, art. 309, provides that no reservation or ex-
ceptions may be made to the Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of
the Convention. LOS Convention article 310 states: "Article 309 does not preclude a
State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention from making declaration or
statements ... to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provision of the
Convention, provided that said declaration or statements do not purport to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Convention in their application to that
State." LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 309-10.
41. 1985 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 12, at 5.
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BOUNDARY DELIMITATIONS
Chile-Argentina Boundary Delimitation: The Beagle Channel
Dispute
The Beagle Channel42 is a 150-mile long strait in the Tierra del
Fuego archipelago, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans at
the tip of South America. The strategic and economic value of this
body of water has fueled a century-old dispute between Chile and
Argentina, almost resulting in a 1978 military confrontation.4 3 The
dispute concerns the sparsely populated islands of Lennox, Nueva,
and Picton. These islands host lucrative fishing grounds, and contain
the possibility of subsoil and subsurface petroleum resources."
Various attempts at negotiation, mediation, and arbitration have
failed, including one by the United States, two by the Queen of Eng-
land, and one by the Vatican.45 Following the collapse of an addi-
tional effort to mediate the dispute by the UN Security Council and
the Organization of American States in December 1978,46 Argentina
mobilized its troops for an invasion of Chile. The Vatican intervened
on December 13, 1978. As a result, Argentina recalled its troops
hours before the attack. Following this incident, the Vatican began
mediating an agreement between the two countries. Frustrated by
numerous rejections by the military regime of Argentina, the Vati-
can presented a "take it or leave it" agreement, which both countries
accepted and signed on November 29, 1984.17 The final steps in
resolving the long-standing dispute occurred this year on May 1,
1985, when both governments and Pope John Paul II signed a treaty
at the Vatican. 48
42. The Beagle Channel was named after the ship Charles Darwin sailed through
it in 1833. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 9 (1986).
43. See generally Morris, The 1984 Argentine-Chilean Pact of Peace and Friend-
ship, OCEANUS, Summer 1985, at 93.
44. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1984, at A5, col. 1 (city ed.).
45. See, e.g., id. The 1978 arbitration under Queen Elizabeth II of Britain, pro-
posed respecting claims by Chile to the islands and a part of the South Atlantic. Argen-
tina rejected the proposed settlement, even though the arbitration was intended to be
binding.
In 1980 Pope John Paul II proposed a compromise which favored Chile by creating a
zone in the South Atlantic that would be shared by the two countries. Argentina, still
under military rule, rejected the proposal.
46. Time, Oct. 29, 1984, at 59, col. 2.
47. Washington Post, July 26, 1984, at A26, col. 3.
48. Citizens for Ocean Law, Ocean Pol'y News, May 1985, at 1. The success of
the treaty can be attributed, in large part, to Argentinean President Raul Alfonsin's
newly elected democratic government, which placed a high priority on avoiding war with
Chile and cutting military spending to promote internal economic recovery.
Georges Bank
On October 12, 1984, the ICJ ruled to delimit the ocean boundary
between the United States and Canada, in an area commonly re-
ferred to as "Georges Bank."49 The court's holding was criticised,50
however, as it left the parties to resolve numerous issues them-
selves. 51 Among the unresolved issues were conflicts between fishery
and oil interests,52 overfishing of migrating species, dumping dis-
putes, and political issues.53
Northwest Passage
In 1985 Canada claimed the Northwest Passage as Canadian ter-
ritory. The United States has long considered this maritime area an
international waterway. Canada asserted its claim on September 10,
1985, when the Secretary of State for External Affairs issued an Or-
der of Council, listing geographical coordinates from which Canada's
Arctic baselines would be drawn. 54 The resulting baselines enclose as
internal waters the Canadian Arctic archipelago, also known as the
Northwest Passage.55
The designation of the baselines was in response to a long-standing
rivalry of sovereignty over the Arctic Ocean and fear of misuse of
the environment.56 Though the United States considers the North-
west Passage an international strait open to all shipping, Canada as-
serts that the Northwest Passage passes through islands claimed by
Canada, and therefore lies within Canadian territory. In 1969 Can-
ada protested the passage of the American oil tanker, Manhattan,
when it sailed through the Northwest Passage without asking Ot-
tawa's permission. 57 Fearful of pollution resulting from commercial
49. See LOS Bulletin No. 4, supra note 2, at 73. See generally Schneider, The
Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 539 (1985);
MacLeish, On Troubled Waters - Oil in the Bank, OCEANUS, March-April 1985, at 62;
McDorman, Saunders, & Vanderznaag, The Gulf of Maine Boundary, 9 MARINE POL'Y
90 (1985).
50. Clain, Gulf of Maine - A. Disappointing First in the Delimitation of a Single
Maritime Boundary, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 521 (1985).
51. For an indepth discussion of the continuing disputes regarding the Georges
Bank area, see Christie, Georges Bank: Common Ground or Continued Battleground?,
23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 491 (1986).
52. See Donaldson & Pontecorvo, Economic Rationalization of Fisheries: The
Problem of Conflicting National Interests on Georges Bank, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J.
149 (1980).
53. See Brillon, Political-Legal Interactions in the Gulf of Maine, A Cana-
dian-American Dispute, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 357 (1984).
54. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 8, 9.
55. Id.
56. See generally Canada Responds, Bolsters Claim to Northwest Passage, L.A.
Times, Sept. 11, 1985, sect. I., at 16, col. 1.
57. U.S. Ship's Arctic Voyage Draws Heat in Canada, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1,
1985, A2, col. I (city ed.).
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shipping, Canada, in 1970, enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act which prohibits the discharge of any substance from a
ship in Canadian Arctic waters. 8
The claim to the Northwest Passage proclaimed Canada's desire
for sovereignty in the Arctic. It also fueled the fire of boundary dis-
putes for the 1986 year.
FISHING TREATIES
Article 56 of the LOS Convention grants the expansion of coastal-
state jurisdiction over living and nonliving resources within a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) .59 This grant has caused fric-
tion between distant-water fishing states, who have long enjoyed fish-
ing as a freedom of the high seas, and small coastal states, who feel
entitled to sovereignty over all fishery resources within that 200-mile
zone.
6 0
To alleviate this friction, many littoral states negotiate fishing
rights and conservation agreements with distant-water nations. 1
While arrangements with some nations such as Japan have been suc-
cessful, other attempted agreements have been disappointing. The
Pacific Island nations contend that the difficulty in potential agree-
ments with the United States lies in the United States attitude to-
wards migratory species. This lack of accord stems from the United
states refusal to recognize the 200-mile EEZ limit with regard to
tuna resources.6 2 Pacific Island countries interpret article 56 as in-
cluding tuna and other highly migratory species of fish. These na-
tions strongly assert their sovereign rights of exploration, exploita-
tion, conservation and management of all living and nonliving
natural resources within the EEZ.63
The Pacific Island nations cite articles 63 and 64 of the LOS Con-
vention as permitting coastal states to conserve migratory species.
These provisions permit the establishment of conservation programs
58. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 2 (1970).
59. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 56.
60. Narokobi, The Tuna Issue: The South Pacific and the United States, in CON-
SENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVEN-
TION 370 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1985).
61. See generally Comment, Territorial Waters - Agreement Providing for the
Issuance of International Licenses for Fishing Tuna in the Eastern Pacific Ocean - An
Attempt at Uniformity in an Area Where Conflicting Jurisdictional Claims Have Cre-
ated Tensions and Conflicts, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 235 (1984).
62. Id.
63. Id.
in areas both internal and external to the 200-mile zone.64 To
achieve the goal of conservation, the island-states must gather infor-
mation concerning fish harvests beyond the 200-mile limit to deter-
mine whether overfishing of migratory species beyond the EEZ
would deplete the stock within a coastal state's EEZ.6 5
Distant-water fishing nations, such as the United States, are ex-
cluded from membership in the South Pacific Forum Fisheries
Agency.66 This exclusion guarantees the littoral states sovereignty
over species in their 200-mile EEZ. The policy-setting membership
of this agency consists of only Pacific Island coastal states. 7
The United States refuses to accept coastal-state sovereignty over
tuna; it prefers to establish international bilateral agreements. Presi-
dent Reagan, in his 1983 proclamation establishing a 200-mile EEZ
for the United States, specifically excluded tuna from coastal-state
sovereignty. He stated that such migratory species require interna-
tional agreements for effective management.6 8 The United States
failure to respect the 200-mile fisheries zones of many coastal states
has lead to foreign relations problems and so-called "tuna wars."
Such disputes have resulted in the seizure of United States fishing
vessels and the confiscation of their catch.69
In sum, many island-states are attempting to negotiate agreements
recognizing their sovereignty over tuna resources within their EEZ
and their conservation efforts outside their EEZ. Other treaty goals
are: 1) cooperation in tuna harvesting; and 2) the transfer of tech-
nology and skills to exploit the tuna resources for mutual benefit;70
and 3) scientific research designed to preserve tuna resources, partic-
64. Id.
65. Article 64, dealing with highly migratory species, permits conservation of
such species both within and beyond the EEZ. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 64.
66. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency is based in Honiara, Solomon Is-
lands. San Diego Union, Mar. 16, 1986, at Cl, col. 1.
67. Id.
68. President Reagan's March 10, 1983, Proclamation No. 5030, states: "This
Proclamation does not change existing United States policies concerning the continental
shelf, marine mammals and fisheries, including high migratory species of tuna which are
not subject to United States jurisdiction and require international agreements for effec-
tive management." 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983).
69. In June 1984 for example, the Solomon Islands seized the United States tuna
boat, Jeannette Diana, and held it until February 1985, at which time they sold it back
to its owners for 700,000 dollars. Although the Solomon Islands have no navy or gun-
boats, they captured the Jeannette Diana by using a yacht of visiting Australians. These
yachtsmen shared in the proceeds the Solomon Islands received from the Jeannette Di-
ana's owners. San Diego Union, Mar. 16, 1986, at Cl, col. 1.
70. As developing nations, many Pacific Island nations lack both the capital and
technology to develop tuna resources. In exchange for licenses to fish in their waters, they
seek the transfer of fishing technology and capital. These nations also seek to have the
fish processed in their countries, in order to benefit the local economies, rather than hav-
ing the fish removed for processing elsewhere. Norokobi, The Tuna Issue: The South
Pacific and the United States, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 370.
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ularly their spawning grounds.71
South Pacific Tuna Discussions
While no final agreement has been reached, several meetings of
the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency have stimulated much
discussion. In December 1984 member states met with United States
officials to discuss a possible umbrella agreement for access by
United States tuna fleets to South Pacific waters. 72 In March 1985
the countries agreed that a single license could be issued authorizing
tuna fishing in an agreed area, rather than requiring fleets to acquire
individual national licenses. 73
The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency met again with United
States officials in June 1985 in Wellington, New Zealand. Although
no concrete results emerged, the countries discussed the access of
foreign tuna fishermen to South Pacific waters and enforcement
rights of coastal and flag states. 4
United States-Canada Salmon Agreement
In contrast to the disappointing South Pacific tuna discussions, the
United States and Canada entered a salmon agreement which was
signed and ratified by both countries in record time. The agreement
was signed on January 28, 1985, resolving a fifteen year dispute be-
tween the two countries concerning west coast salmon resources. 75
The management of Pacific salmon represents a transboundary
stock problem. Hatching in rivers along the west coast of North
71. See Namaliu, The U.S. Position on Tuna and the Pacific Island Nations, in
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CON-
VENTION, supra note 60, at 377.
72. Citizens for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 7.
73. Citizens for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 9.
74. Id.
75. H.R. 1093, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H402 (1985); see also
Citizens for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 7.
Prior to 1985, Canada and the United States had unsuccessfully negotiated a salmon
treaty for over fifteen years. The desired result was one limiting the number of salmon
caught that originate in the rivers of the other country. The purpose of such an agree-
ment is to assure that both parties reap the benefits invested in their salmon fisheries. See
Citizens for Ocean Law, Ocean Pol'y News, Jan.-Feb. 1985. One factor hindering an
agreement is that the fishermen who would benefit from the agreement are not those who
would pay its price. For example, an Alaskan fisherman may be asked to reduce his
catch of salmon destined for Canadian rivers and a Canadian fisherman may be asked to
reduce his catch bound for Washington state. Id. The Alaskan fisherman suffers greatly
but receives no corresponding benefit, while the Washington fisherman's stock is in-
creased with no corresponding detriment to him.
America, salmon spend most of their life cycle in the high seas; they
return to rivers only at the end of their lives. On returning to the
rivers of their birth, they are caught by commercial fisheries. The
dispute arose because salmon, which spawn in the rivers of the
United States, are caught by Canadian fisherman off the coast of
Canada, before the fish come within United States jurisdiction and
vice versa.76 Transboundary rivers, such as the Yukon, exacerbate
the problem, as it is difficult to determine in which country the fish
spawned and to which they should belong when caught.
Finally, the United States-Canadian Salmon Agreement was ap-
proved and satisfied the varied interests of both nations' commercial
and sport interests, as well as Native American fishermen and fish
processors.77
Other United States Fisheries Activity
In an amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (MFCMA), 8 the United States exclusive fishery
management authority was extended to straddling stocks7 9 beyond
the United States EEZ. The purpose of this amendment was to elim-
inate high seas interception of salmon of United States origin by
other countries. The amendment recommends that negotiations be
conducted with Canadian and Japanese fishermen to achieve this
purpose.80 The MFCMA is consistent with the LOS Convention arti-
cle 64, which permits a coastal state to exercise conservation mea-
sures beyond its EEZ to achieve conservation within its EEZ.81
Governing International Fisheries Agreements
United States law"' requires a 60-day review period after Gov-
erning International Fisheries Agreements (GIFAs) are submitted to
Congress.83 If no contrary action is taken, such negotiated agree-
ments automatically become effective.
76. Colson, Transboundary Fishery Stocks in the EEZ, OCEANUS, Winter 1984-
1985, at 48-49.
77. The implementing legislation of the House of Representatives was HR-1093.
H.R. 1093, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 CONG. REc. H402 (1985). The implementing legis-
lation of the Senate was Public Law 99-5.
78. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801-
1861 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MFCMA]. The amendment, S. 1245, was introduced
by Senator Stevens on June 5, 1985, S. 1245, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec.
57459 (1985).
79. The definition of a straddling stock is one located both within and beyond, but
adjacent, to a nations' EEZ.
80. Citizens for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, July 1985, at 7.
81. LOS Convention, supra note 1 art. 64.
82. The MFCMA requires the 60 day review period after a fishing agreement is
submitted to Congress, before it can become law. 16 U.S.C. § 1823 (1976).
83. Citizens for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Nov. 1985, at 4.
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On August 1, 1985, Poland and the United States signed a GIFA
covering fishing by Polish vessels within the United States EEZ.M
The mandatory 60-day review period ended on November 15,
1985.85 The United States-Poland GIFA becomes effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1986. A GIFA signed between the United States and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China in July 1985,86 also completed its 60-day
review period on November 15, 1985. This agreement will be imple-
mented once the Department of State is apprised that the formal
exchange of notes has taken place. 7 A proposal to extend the ex-
isting United States-Soviet GIFA was submitted to Congress on Oc-
tober 1, 1985. This GIFA, which would have lapsed without the ex-
tension, is expected to complete its 60-day review period on
December 12, 1985. It will enter into force on January 1, 1986 along
with the GIFAs with Poland and the People's Republic of China.8
Soviet-Kiribati Fishing Treaty
During 1985, the Soviet Union quietly signed an agreement with
Kiribati, formerly the Gilbert Islands, permitting the Soviet Union
to dispatch one mother ship and sixteen lesser vessels to Kiribati wa-
ters.819 The pact, which gives the Soviet Union fishing rights over 1.4
million square miles of ocean, nets the proverty-stricken island of
Kiribati 1.7 million dollars annually - about ten percent of its
budget.9" The Soviet Union also is attempting to negotiate fishing
agreements with a number of other islands in Oceania.' Tuvalu,
Fiji, Tonga, and the Solomon Islands refuse to permit Soviet fishing,
but Vanatu is considering an agreement. 2
84. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 10.
85. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Dec. 1985, at 2.
86. The United States-People's Republic of China GIFA was signed during the
Chinese President's visit to the United States during July 1985. Id. at 2.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. San Diego Union, Mar. 11, 1986, at C1, col. 1.
90. Id. Kiribati's other main source of income is from fish licensing agreements,
foreign aid, and a small copra trade.
91. Id. The American Tuna Association and some military sources believe that
the purpose of the Soviet fishing licenses in the South Pacific is for intelligence gathering,
rather than fishing pursuits.
92. Id.
MARINE MAMMALS: THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
LAWSUIT
Under United States law, a nation must be certified when it acts
to "diminish the effectiveness of the International Whaling Commis-
sion.''93 The certification process automatically halves the quality of
fish, including whales, a nation is permitted to harvest in United
States waters.
In 1982 the International Whaling Commission (IWC) banned all
hunting of endangered sperm whale. In November 1984 the United
States, however, agreed to permit Japan to continue whaling, in con-
travention of the IWC ban.94 As part of the agreement, Japan with-
drew its objection to the IWC ban, and avoided the certification pro-
cess. The agreement allows Japan to continue to harvest up to 400
sperm whales during the 1984 and 1985 seasons and up to 200 dur-
ing the 1986 and 1987 seasons.95
The American Cetacean Society and other environmental organi-
zations filed a lawsuit 8 against the Departments of State and Com-
merce challenging the right of the United States government to
93. There are two sanctions which the United States can impose on nations defy-
ing International Whaling Commission (IWC) regulations: the 1971 Pelly Amendment
to the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978, and the 1979 Packwood/
Magnuson Amendment to the United States Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1821. Both punitive measures derive their authority from the
United States Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, which declared the intent of the
United States to protect and manage ocean mammals for the health and stability of the
marine ecosystem, rather than for commercial exploitation.
The Pelly Amendment states that when the Secretary of Commerce determines that
nationals of a foreign country are conducting fishing operations which "diminish the ef-
fectiveness" of any international fisheries conservation program to which the United
States is a party, he shall so certify to the President. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1). The Presi-
dent may then direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of fish
products of the offending nation. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4).
The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment requires "certification," or the halving of a na-
tions' fisheries allocation in the United States fishery conservation zone, if the nation
"diminishes the effectiveness" of the IWC. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i). See generally
Leggett, International Whaling Policy, MARINE PoL'Y REP., May 1985, at 1.
94. The IWC was founded in 1945 to provide for the conservation, management,
and optimum utilization of whale stocks, and adopted a five year commercial whaling
moratorium in 1982. The moratorium was to enter into force in 1985-1986. The IWC
has no enforcement powers and is required to release a state from the mandates of the
decision if a formal objection is filed by a dissatisfied state within a 90-day time period.
Of the seven nations voting against the phase-down moratorium, Japan, the Soviet
Union, Norway, and Peru filed formal objections within the accepted period, and thus
maintained their right to continue whaling after the moratorium took effect. Brazil, Ice-
land, and South Korea voted against the moratorium, but agreed to abide by it and have
withdrawn from the whaling industry. Peru voted against the moratorium, but withdrew
its objection in 1983 and agreed to comply with the moratorium. Only Japan, the Soviet
Union and Norway remain engaged in commercial whaling. Leggett, supra note 93, at 1.
95. Citizens for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 5.
96. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1985),
affd, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986).
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make a bilateral agreement with Japan that circumvented IWC de-
cisions.97 The plaintiffs contended that Secretary of Commerce Mal-
colm Baldrige violated a clear and nondiscretionary duty by failing
to certify Japan, because Japanese nationals were engaged in sperm
whaling in violation of the IWC ban for the 1984-1985 season.Y8 The
defendants maintained that agreements with the Japanese are within
the scope of government discretion to determine what activities di-
minish the IWC's effectiveness. 99
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia or-
dered the United States to certify Japan for its violation of the IWC
ban on killing sperm whales.100 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision;10 1 however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
January 13, 1986.102
In contrast to the governments handling of Japan, the United
States application of the Packwood-Magnuson amendment to the
USSR's excessive minke whale catch in Antarctica was much more
stringent. On April 3, 1985, Secretary Baldridge certified the Soviet
Union, halving the quota of fish which the Soviet Union would be
permitted to catch in United States waters.103 However, the Bal-
dridge decision, by holding that in such situations that certification
is mandatory and not discretionary, should equalize the application
of United States law towards all foreign nations.
POLLUTION
The long-term consequences of pollution on marine life, both plant
and animal, are unknown. Pollutants may interact with marine
plants and animals, the atmosphere, ocean sediment, and the water
itself.104 Concern over the control of dumping wastes into the sea in
accordance with the LOS Convention has arisen.105 In 1985 this con-
97. See generally Ellis, Whaling, Conservation, and Diplomacy, OCEANUS, Fall
1985, at 76.
98. American Cetacean Soc'y, 604 F. Supp. at 1410.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986).
102. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986). At the time of
publication of this Synopsis, the Supreme Court had heard the case and reversed the
lower courts. See American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986).
103. Leggett, supra note 93.
104. Kaharl, CAMS - A Think Tank for Global Ocean Problems, OCEANUS, Fall
1985, at 50.
105. See generally Hoffmeyer, Ocean Dumping Provisions of the Convention on
the Law of the Sea, I I BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 355 (1985); Kindt, International Environ-
cern focused on protecting the ocean from the radioactive waste"',
and oil pollution.1 0 7
Nuclear Waste Dumping Bans
The London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters (London Dumping Conven-
tion) prohibits high-level radioactive wastes from being dumped at
sea.108 Annex II permits certain wastes, including low-level radioac-
tive wastes, to be dumped at sea. 109
At the Seventh Consultative Meeting in 1983, a resolution was
adopted calling for the suspension of radioactive waste dumping in-
cluding low-level wastes, pending expert reports." 0 At the June 1985
meeting of the London Dumping Convention, Spain sponsored a res-
olution to continue the ban on the dumping of low-level wastes which
was adopted by a vote of twenty-five to six."' The United States,
France, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Canada
voted against the resolution and seven countries abstained.,, 2
The Ninth Consultative Meeting in September 1985 reconsidered
the moratorium on low-level radioactive wastes." 3 The South Pacific
nations called for a permanent ban."14 The Consultative Meeting ex-
amined the report of an expert scientific panel,1" 5 which failed to
reach unanimous agreement, or provide substantive conclusions or
recommendations. Therefore, the resolution was considered to be de-
void of expert advice. The parties voted to continue the present sus-
pension of the dumping of all radioactive wastes, both high-level and
mental Law and Policy: An Overview of Transboundary Pollution, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 583 (1986).
Los Convention article 194, paragraph 2, prohibits ocean dumping which could result
in transboundary pollution. Article 210, paragraph 5, prohibits ocean dumping in the
territorial sea, economic zone, or continental shelf without the permission of the coastal
state. Ocean dumping in areas beyond national jurisdiction should be regulated under the
1972 Convention of the Prevention of Marine Pollution of Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter (Ocean Dumping Convention or London Dumping Convention). Kindt, supra
note 105, at 583.
106. See generally Kindt, Ocean Dumping, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 335
(1984).
107. See generally Rosenthal & Raper, AMOCO Cadiz & Limitation of Liability
for Oil Spill Pollution: Domestic and International Solutions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES
L. 259 (1985).
108. 16 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 431 (1985).
109. Id.
110. Id. The United Kingdom, however, declined to accept the resolution as bind-
ing and continued to dump low-level radioactive wastes in the Atlantic. The dumping
finally was prevented by the National Union of Seamen and other transport unions which





115. 1985 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 12, at 16.
[VOL. 23: 701, 1986] Recent Developments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
low-level.116 No time limit on the ban was set; however, when consid-
ering dumping in the future, those who favor dumping have the bur-
den of proving that it causes no harm to human health.
117
Sub-Seabed Disposal
Though the London Dumping Convention prohibits the dumping
of high-level radioactive wastes, there has been much discussion of
disposing these wastes beneath the seabed.118 Technologies for sea-
bed emplacement and sub-seabed disposal of high-level radioactive
wastes - such as radioactive waste disposal in boreholes drilled into
the seabed - are being examined by several nuclear nations, includ-
ing the United Kingdom. 119 Disagreement exists as to whether the
London Dumping Convention applies to such activities.1
20
At the Eighth Consultative Meeting in 1984, which ended without
agreement, two draft resolutions were circulated. 121 One draft pro-
posed that disposal of wastes into the seabed should not occur until
research establishes that it is technically feasible and environmen-
tally acceptable. 122 The second resolution, which reflected the major-
ity opinion of parties to the Convention, stated that for the purposes
of the Convention, "disposal at sea" includes disposal of wastes into
the seabed. Consequently, the burial of high-level radioactive wastes
in the seabed is prohibited. 23 Discussion of the issue has been sus-
pended until 1986.124
Oil Pollution
During 1985, coastal nations attempted to alleviate oil pollution
through various legal and administrative remedies.' 25 Although most
countries limited their measures to economic sanctions, others have
resorted to punitive procedures.
The courts in West Germany, for example, have issued stringent
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See generally Curtis, Legality of Seabed Disposal of High Level Radioactive
Wastes Under the London Dumping Convention, 14 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. J. 383
(1985).
119. 16 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 431 (1985).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 432.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 1985 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 12, at 16.
125. See generally Farrington, Oil Pollution: A Decade of Research and Monitor-
ing, OCEANUS, Fall 1985, at 2.
judgments against oil polluters to establish their lack of tolerance for
pollution of Germany's territorial waters. 126 A Brazilian engineer of
the Tapajos received a six-month suspended sentence for allowing oil
and water to be pumped overboard into the German Bight in August
1985.127
In October 1985 an oil slick six miles long and fifty meters wide,
was traced to the Egyptian ship Nefertiti. 28 Again, harsh sanctions
were imposed by the West German courts. Two crew members re-
ceived sentences for their involvement and the court ordered the ves-
sel seized.1 29
NEWS EVENTS
The Achille Lauro: An Act of Piracy
Terrorism that frequently has disrupted air traffic expanded to
maritime traffic on October 7, 1985. Four members of a Palestine
Liberation Organization splinter group commandeered the Achille
Lauro, an Italian cruise ship. Four hundred passengers were aboard
the vessel. 130 The hijackers segregated the Americans and British
from the other passengers and demanded the release of fifty Pales-
tinian prisoners held in Israel. When an attempted landing at Tar-
tus, Syria, was refused, the hijackers shot and killed an American
and dumped the body overboard.""
Unaware that a passenger had been murdered, '13 2 Egyptian Presi-
dent Hosni Mubarak agreed to give the hijackers safe transportation
out of Egypt in exchange for the release of the passengers and the
vessel. On October 10, 1985, American Navy F-14 fighter planes
intercepted the Egyptian airliner transporting the hijackers to Al-
giers and forced it to land in Sicily. 3 The United States attempted





130. There were approximately 118 passengers and 300 crew members on the
Achille Lauro at the time of the hijacking. 650 of the original 748 passengers had dis-
embarked at Alexandria for sightseeing and were to reboard at Port Said. The ship was
hijacked between Alexandria and Port Said. Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985 at 34; Wall St. J.,
Oct. 9, 1985 at 1, col. 3.
131. Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
132. In his negotiations with the hijackers, Egyptian President Hosni Murbarak
relied on a radio message from the ship's Captain de Rosa, stating that no one on board
had been harmed. The message was later found to be false when it was learned that Leon
Klinghoffer, an American, had been murdered. Time, Oct. 28, 1985 at 31, col. 1.
133. From Sicily, the hijackers were returned to Italy to stand trial. The Italians
claimed jurisdiction over the hijackers on the grounds that the ship was an Italian ship,
therefore an extension of Italian territory. Four Italian cities claimed jurisdiction, but as
of October 21, 1985, only Genoa, the port where hijackers boarded ship, had issued ar-
rest warrants. The Italians filed charges ranging from high-seas hijacking to murder.
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to extradite the hijackers and their leader from Italy, but Italy
refused.1134
The ramifications of the Achille Lauro hijacking and retaliatory
United States air interception affected relationships among the
United States, Egypt, Italy, and the Arab world. 13 The Reagan Ad-
ministration resolved to pursue a counter-terror crusade, even at the
expense of tranquil relations with Italy and Egypt. At the November
1985 meeting of the International Maritime Organization in
London, the United States requested the development of procedures
for responding to acts of terrorism at sea.
Bombing of the Greenpeace Environmental Ship, the Rainbow
Warrior
On July 10, 1985, while berthed at New Zealand's Auckland Har-
bor, the Rainbow Warrior, a 160-foot Greenpeace136 environmental
vessel, was sunk by explosives attached to its hull.1 37 The Rainbow
Warrior was to have led a flotilla protesting French nuclear testing
at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific. New Zealand Prime Minis-
ter, David Lange, called the incident a criminal act with "terrorist
overtones".138
Two people were arrested and charged with murder and arson and
were later discovered to be members of the French General Director-
ate for External Security, the French espionage and intelligence
Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985 at 32; Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1985 at 1, col. 3.
134. Italy's Prime Minister Benetto Craxi said President Reagan had requested
custody of the four hijackers, but Craxi refused. Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreo-
tii stated that "[t]he Americans were not aware that the Italian judiciary had prece-
dence." Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 33.
135. The hijacking increased awareness of terrorism and demonstrated the need
for appropriate responses to terrorism. Egyptian President Mubarak denounced the
United States interception. Time, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22. In Italy, the coalition government
of Prime Minister Bettino Craxi collapsed under criticism of its handling of the crisis,
although it was later revived. Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 33, col. 1; Wall St. J., Oct.
31, 1985, at 1, col. 3. In response to United States outrage at terrorism on a world-wide
scale, the UN General Assembly withdrew an invitation formerly extended to Yasser
Arafat to speak during the UN's 40th anniversary celebrations. Time, Oct. 28, 1985, at
28.
136. Greenpeace, an environmental organization based in Lewes, England, was
founded in 1971 by Canadian environmentalists. The Rainbow Warrior, a 30 year old
converted Scottish trawler has been seized by numerous countries during Greenpeace
activities since it was purchased in 1977. One recent activity includes photographing So-
viet whaling operations on the Bering Sea coast, at which time seven crew members
where caught and briefly held in Siberian jails. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1985, at A3, col. 1
(city ed.).
137. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1985, at A4, col. 1 (city ed.).
138. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1985, at A3, col. 1 (city ed.).
agency. 139 The French government eventually admitted that French
agents had planted the bomb that sank the Rainbow Warrior.140
The level of the French government's involvement in the bombing
is still unknown, however, the episode highlights France's attitude
toward protecting its nuclear testing program in the South Pacific, 41
which conflicts with the South Pacific nations' desire to be nuclear
free.
Iran-Iraq War
Frequent attacks on neutral merchant ships and oil tankers by the
warring nations of Iran and Iraq hindered freedom of navigation in
the Persian Gulf during 1985.142 Over the course of the year, Iraq
continuously bombed the Kharg Island oil terminal in the Persian
Gulf. 43 The attacks were successful in achieving Iraq's goal of slow-
ing Iran's oil shipments.'44
Iran threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a vital oil
tanker route at the southern end of the Persian Gulf, in retaliation
for Iraq's raids on Kharg Island. Tarik Aziz, Iraq's Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister, declared that Iraq would stop the




This year saw the discovery of the Titanic,146 as well as an English
decision that the cargo of the sunken Lusitania did not belong to the
home crown, since it was found in international waters. 47 The
United States attempt to establish a salvage-free international monu-
ment to the Titanic' 48 in an effort to maintain its treasures for the
benefit of mankind, by preventing the looting of its cargo.
The law of salvage and customary international law controls na-
139. Newsweek, Oct. 7, 1985, at 42.
140. Id.
141. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1985, at A3, col. I (city ed.).
142. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at
4, col. 1. The freedom of navigation and the right of passage are essential freedoms of
the high seas and international straits. These rights, however, sometimes are ignored dur-
ing times of war and remain unaddressed by the LOS Convention. See Synopsis, Recent
Developments in the Law of the Sea 1983-1984. 22 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 801, 801-21
(1985).
143. E.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
144. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
145. Id.
146. See generally Rabushka & Ryan, The Discovery of the Titanic by the U.S.
and French Expedition, OCEANUS, Winter 1985-1986, at 16.
147. Pierce v. Bemis, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 501 (Q.B. 1985).
148. H.R. 3272, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 CONG. REc. H7408 (1985).
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tional sovereignty over shipwrecks. Within the territorial sea,14 9 a
nation may exercise full sovereign rights and therefore have com-
plete authority to regulate underwater archaeological activities. 150
International law permits coastal nations to, assert jurisdiction and
control over subsoil and seabed natural resources of the continental
shelf which encompasses archeological resources. 15'
Nevertheless, in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. the Unidentified
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 52 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected the United States government ownership claim
to an ancient Spanish galleon which had been discovered by salvors.
The court held that the United States jurisdiction over the continen-
tal shelf did not extend to the ownership of shipwrecks of any
vintage.' 53
The LOS Convention's view is somewhat at odds with both cur-
rent international law principles and the decision in Treasure Sal-
vors. Article 149 of the LOS Convention provides for giving pre-
ferred rights to the country of origin:
All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area
shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, with
particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State or coun-




The recently decided English case, Pierce v. Bemis'55 concerned
the ownership of salvaged materials found on the sunken Lusita-
nia.56 At the time of her loss, the Lusitania belonged to the Cunard
Steamship Company and had war risks insurance with the London
and Liverpool War Risks Associated Limited. These insurance com-
panies paid the owners in full for the total loss of the ship, thereby
149. The United States, Britain, Singapore, and Belgium have territorial seas of
three nautical miles. Some Latin American countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Nica-
ragua and some African nations claim territorial seas of 200 miles. See generally Cycon,
Legal and Regulatory Issues in Marine Archaeology, OCEANUS, Spring 1985, at 1.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
153. But see Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1985, H.R. 25, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1985).
154. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 149.
155. Pierce v. Bemis, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 501 (Q.B. 1985).
156. The Lusitania was a British registered passenger liner which was torpedoed in
international waters on May 7, 1915, by a submarine of the Imperial German Navy. The
ship sank in 315 feet of water outside both Irish and British territorial sea. Id.
acquiring legal title. The ownership of the vessel itself was not in
dispute, but rather the ownership of its contents: personal property
and effects of the passengers and general cargo. 157 The English Ad-
miralty Court held that noone had a better right to the property
than the salvors. 158
The Titanic
The Titanic, which sank after a collision with an iceberg in 1912,
elicited several unsuccessful salvage expeditions. 159 However, on Sep-
tember 2, 1985, a joint United States-French expedition discovered
the Titanic 500 miles south of Newfoundland.1 60 The ship was intact
and upright at a depth of 13,000 feet below sea level.161 The discov-
ery of the Titanic raises legal issues involving ownership,162 salvage
rights, and the implications of creating an international memorial.
Under present international law, the wreck of the Titanic is avail-
able for salvage by any individual who desires to invest in such an
endeavor. 613 The original owners, successors in interest, and modern
finders or salvors may all claim ownership rights in the vessel.164
Most of the scientists on the expedition which discovered the Titanic
want no salvage effort and would like the Titanic to remain an inter-
national memorial.1 65 A proposed federal law 6 seeks to designate
the Titanic shipwreck a maritime memorial. Because the wreck was
found in international waters, the bill seeks a moratorium on salvage
operations until an international agreement can be reached which
would govern the activities at the site. 67
ELLEN MOFFAT FRY
157. Id. The insurers were legally entitled to the vessel, including her hull, machin-
ery, appurtenances, fixtures, and fitting, loose equipment, and furniture and other goods
owned at the time of the loss.
158. Id.
159. Scavotta, Salvaging the Titanic: An Impossible Dream?, OCEANUS, Winter
1985-1986, at 96.
160. See generally Marine Archeology, OCEANUS, Winter 1985-1986, at 3:
Holden, Americans and French Find the Titanic, Sci., Sept. 27, 1985, at 1368;
Marbach, The Sea Gives Up a Secret, Newsweek, Sept. 16, 1985, at 44; Ballard &
Michel, How We Found Titanic, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Dec. 1985, at 696.
161. Id.
162. See generally Cycon, Who Owns the Titanic?, OCEANUS, Winter 1985-1986,
at 94; see also Unsworth, Who Owns the Titanic? J. COMM., Sept. 5, 1985, at IA.
163. Cycon, supra note 162, at 94.
164. Id.
165. Time, Sept. 16, 1985, at 68-70.
166. H.R. 3272, 99th Cong. Ist Sess. 131 CONG. REC. H7408 (1985). See supra
text accompanying note 148.
167. Cycon, supra note 162, at 95.
